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5 April 1962

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



TOP SECRET

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*Syria: Tension and uncertainty evidently continue in Damascus as Syrian officers jockey for position in the new military command. Col. Haydar al-Kuzbari, a key leader of last September's revolt, is rumored to be plotting against the command. Apparently as a precautionary measure, tanks were drawn up around army headquarters early yesterday evening and sand bags were being placed around the building. Armored cars were placed at strategic points throughout Damascus as if trouble were expected.

In Aleppo, newly arrived army units are patrolling the city, while the commando and paratroop units which carried out the pro-UAR coup on 1 April have been withdrawn from the city. Tanks are stationed at the perimeter of the city, and local police and army units are keeping order. As late

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as noon yesterday some UAR flags were still being flown on many buildings as insurance against vandalism by pro-UAR elements, who had still been demonstrating that morning.

Cairo's initial satisfaction over the apparent pro-UAR trend of developments has begun to yield to one of uncertainty and some anger. Cairo Radio has accused the General Command in Damascus of sabotaging the "Homs Agreement," which it had hailed earlier as having averted bloodshed and civil war. The Egyptians particularly criticized the retention of Air Force commander Brigadier Assassa, who they allege secured the ing Kuzbari. Cairo describes Kuzbari as a known Jordanian agent.


release from detention of "reactionary" army elements, includ-25X1 25X1 On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board on 4 April reached the following conclusion concerning the Middle East The situation in the Middle East remains precarious, but the Syrian crisis has reached a stage--for the moment at least--which reduces the likelihood of early intervention by 25X1 Egypt, Jordan, or Israel. However, Israeli-Syrian clashes in the Lake Tiberias area are likely to continue. 25X1 France-Algeria: 25X1 the OAS no longer exists as a "valid political force" in France even though the danger of isolated acts of terrorism in the metropole will continue for sometime.

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Situation Report--Jamaica: Elements of political and economic instability will probably become increasingly evident after Jamaica becomes independent on 6 August. Although the 10 April elections could be won by either of the two principal political parties--both moderately conservative and pro-US--factionalism may lead to a post-election break-25X1 up of the defeated party and increased influence for leftist elements. Some members of the government are concerned over Jamaica's vulnerability after independence to a Communist subversive effort directed from Cuba. Such an effort would exploit discontent among the island's chronically unemployed. The economy, now viable and relatively diversified, is threatened by British curbs on immigration from Jamaica, and Britain's expected adherence to the Common Market may reduce Jamaica's export opportunity. 25X1 (Backup, Page 6)

CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB SUBCOMMITTEE ON BERLIN SITUATION

The United States Intelligence Board has approved the following conclusions reached by its Special Berlin Subcommittee which reviewed the situation for the period 21 March through 3 April 1962:

- 1. The present pattern of Soviet behavior indicates that Moscow does not intend to precipitate a confrontation with the West in the near future and that it wishes to conduct further high-level exchanges with the US on a Berlin settlement. The treatment by Soviet public media of the Rusk-Gromyko talks at Geneva has conveyed an impression that some progress, however slight, was made on the Berlin and German problems.
- 2. The Soviets, however, seem to believe that this phase of negotiations with the US on Berlin continues to afford an

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opportunity for further efforts to restrict and erode Western rights. The shift of attention from air access to ground travel to and within Berlin and to the activities of Western military liaison missions in East Germany probably reflects a belief that advances can be made in these areas with less risk and greater chances of success.

- 3. The cessation of scheduled Soviet flights in the air corridors since 29 March probably is intended to appear responsive to private US representations regarding the hazards of air harassments and to President Kennedy's press conference remarks on 29 March welcoming the "care" with which the Soviets are proceeding on Berlin. However, the lull in Soviet flights probably does not indicate a decision to terminate these activities; the Soviets apparently intend to remain cautious and restrained in this crucial area at least pending further developments in negotiations.
- 4. While there does not appear to be a marked increase in public resistance to the East German regime, bitter public complaints over living standards continue in some areas, the workers are more openly opposing regime efforts to step up productivity without pay increases, and passive resistance among farmers remains a serious headache for the regime.
- 5. Despite the regime's drastic security precautions, East Germans still succeed in fleeing to the West, although at a rate slightly below 10 percent of past years. In the first quarter of 1962, a total of 5,649 East Germans applied for asylum, an estimated 40 percent of whom had fled since 13 August 1961. Of these, only 920 persons registered in West Berlin in January and February. (Berlin figures for March are not yet available.) In 1961 the comparable figure was 46,367, of whom 34,275 had fled to West Berlin; total escapes in 1961 reached 207,026, of whom 150,458 escaped via West Berlin.

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WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board concludes that

No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action in the immediate future.

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BERLIN: The focus of continuing Soviet harassing and probing tactics against the Allied presence in Berlin may be shifting temporarily to Western ground access and military liaison missions. However, bloc military activity in general suggests that the Communists do not intend their actions to provoke military confrontation in the immediate future.

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SOUTH VIETNAM: Government forces are waging increasingly aggressive antiguerrilla operations. The Viet Cong, however, generally continue to avoid superior forces and to concentrate upon attacks which they believe are likely to succeed.

INDONESIA: Indonesian infiltration of West New Guinea territory is likely to continue. Naval and air incidents will increase as the Dutch patrol capabilities are enhanced by reinforcements.

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MIDDLE EAST: (Carried on Page iv of Daily Brief) 25X1

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

25X1 The United States Intelligence Board on 4 April approved the following National Intelligence Estimate:

[SNIE 42-62: "The Outlook for South Korea," dated 4 April 1962,

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(Advance conclusions are normally distributed within 24 hours of approval, and the printed text within five days.)

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Southern Rhodesian Premier Makes Overtures to Africans In Nyasaland

Whitehead sent Southern Rhodesian Labor Minister Abrahamson to talk to Banda last week.

the minister told Banda that the whites in Southern Rhodesia realized that the present Federation could not be kept together and asked him what ties the Africans in Nyasaland would agree to retain. A similar approach apparently is to be made later this year to the Africans in Northern Rhodesia. In this way Whitehead reportedly hopes to work out new relationships which could be put in force "by telephone calls" as soon as the present federal structure is dismantled!

Banda told Abrahamson that he could agree to the maintenance of a common currency and central banking system, a common development authority, and-for a trial period-a customs union, in addition to the common defense force. This position is to a large extent contrary to the widespread African opposition to federation in any form. African opposition is so strong and ingrained that even Banda's prestige might be damaged if the switch were made too quickly. For the present the negotiations apparently are to be kept quiet, since Banda refuses to commit himself publicly until Britain explicitly abandons its support for the concept of federation -- a move which London has been unwilling to make

Welensky has become more and more of an embarrassment to his party, particularly to its influential Southern Rhodesian section. His vague threat to use "force" in connection with the Northern Rhodesian constitution alienated public opinion both in the Federation and in Britain; moreover, by calling federal elections for late April he has embroiled his associates in a campaign which few of them feel is necessary and which is being boycotted by all the other parties in Southern Rhodesia. His

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Situation Report: Jamaica

Government-fostered industrial development and years of relatively stable administration leave Jamaica well prepared for independence, but prosperity on the overcrowded island has not permeated to the lower classes. Jamaica is a major producer of bauxite, and its economy is based also on tropical agriculture, light manufacturing, and tourism. It has an average per capita gross national product of \$433, second only to Trinidad of the British islands. However, unemployment now runs at about 14 percent.

After the enthusiasm of achieving independence has subsided, basic problems such as surplus population could cause increasing difficulty for the government. Prospects for the high-cost sugar industry are dimmed by its inability to obtain a larger share of the US market.

Premier Manley's ruling People's National party and the Jamaica Labor party led by his cousin Sir Alexander Bustamente have dominated the island's politics for nearly two decades. Both are committed to upholding provisions of the 1961 Defense Areas Agreement between the US and the West Indies Federation. These concern the US space and missile research facility on Grand Turk Island—a Jamaican dependency—and the right to construct Loran facilities in Jamaica. Premier Manley's overtures for US assistance to Jamaica's defense forces will presumably be followed up by whichever party wins.

The police force can handle any disorders which might occur in connection with the election, but it faces a future internal security problem from increasing numbers of Cuban refugees, some of whom are believed to be Castro agents.

There are differences within the cabinet respecting relations with Cuba. Because of the position taken by Trade and Industries Minister Isaacs, the government rejected a Cuban

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Proposal for exchange visits by 50 students, but he and some other cabinet members still fear that local extremist elements will be exploited by Cuba after independence. Millard Johnson, leader of the People's Progressive party, may already have received some Cuban aid is fearful of a post-independence alliance between various malcontents and Cuban agents.

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THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

Military Representative of the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Emergency Planning

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

